Date original: 20/05/2022 14:16:00



In: KSC-BC-2020-05

The Prosecutor v. Salih Mustafa

Trial Panel I Before:

Judge Mappie Veldt-Foglia, Presiding Judge

Judge Roland Dekkers

Judge Gilbert Bitti

Judge Vladimir Mikula, Reserve Judge

Registrar: Fidelma Donlon

Date: 20 May 2022

English Language:

Classification: Public

Public redacted version of Tenth decision on review of detention

To be notified to:

Counsel for the Accused **Specialist Prosecutor**

Jack Smith Julius von Bóné

Victims' Counsel

Anni Pues

TRIAL PANEL I (Panel) hereby renders this tenth decision on review of detention.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. On 21 March 2022, the Panel issued the "Ninth decision on review of detention"

of Salih Mustafa (Accused).1

2. On 29 April 2022, the Specialist Prosecutor's Office (SPO) filed its submissions

on the tenth review of detention.2

3. The Defence Counsel and Victims' Counsel did not file any submissions.

II. **SUBMISSIONS**

4. The SPO submits that the Accused's continued detention remains necessary and

proportionate.3

The SPO contends that the grounded suspicion that the Accused has committed

crimes within the jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers (SC) continues to exist, as no

circumstances justifying the revision of this finding have occurred since the Ninth

Review; such suspicion has only solidified on account of the conclusion of the SPO's

case, the Panel's rejection of the Defence's motion to dismiss any or all of the charges

(Rule 130 Decision),⁵ and the near completion of the testimony of the Defence

witnesses.6

¹ KSC-BC-2020-05, F00355, Trial Panel I, Ninth decision on review of detention (Ninth Review), 21 March 2022, confidential. A public redacted version was issued the same day, F00355/RED.

² KSC-BC-2020-05, F00400, Specialist Prosecutor, Prosecution submissions for the tenth review of detention

(SPO Submissions), 29 April 2022, public.

³ SPO Submissions, para. 2.

⁴ SPO Submissions, para. 3.

⁵ SPO Submissions, para. 3, referring to KSC-BC-2020-05, F00326, Trial Panel I, Decision on the Defence Rule 130(1) motion to dismiss any or all charges of the Indictment (Rule 130 Decision), 23 February 2022.

A public redacted version was issued the same day, F00326/RED.

⁶ SPO Submissions, para. 3.

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6. The SPO submits that the risk of flight is real, remains high and is even

heightened at this stage of the proceedings, in light of the immediacy of the Panel's

verdict following the conclusion of the Defence case.⁷

7. The SPO further submits that the risk of obstruction of the proceedings through

interference with witnesses and victims and/or their families continues to exist due to

the Accused's close ties to the Kosovo intelligence apparatus, related experience,

technical knowledge and network, as well as his knowledge of the charges and the

potential length of sentence, if convicted.8 The SPO also contends that the manner in

which such interference could take place has been exemplified through the testimony

of witnesses at trial.9

8. The SPO also avers that there is a real risk that, if released, the Accused will

commit further crimes, including crimes against the administration of justice; such

risk has only increased with the closure of the SPO case and the issuance of the

Rule 130 Decision by the Panel.¹⁰

9. In light of the above, the SPO submits that detention is the only means to

effectively mitigate the existing risks, and the duration of the detention remains

reasonable, taking into account the pace of the procedural steps taken during trial.¹¹

III. APPLICABLE LAW

The Panel notes Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights 10.

(ECHR), Articles 29, 31(5) and 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo

(Constitution), Articles 3(2), 21(3), and 41(6) and (10)-(12) of Law No. 05/L-053 on

⁷ SPO Submissions, para. 4.

⁸ SPO Submissions, para. 5.

⁹ SPO Submissions, para. 6.

¹⁰ SPO Submissions, para. 7.

¹¹ SPO Submissions, paras 9, 11.

Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office (Law), and Rule 57(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (Rules).

IV. **ANALYSIS**

11. At the outset, the Panel recalls that the presumption of innocence, as provided for in Article 31(5) of the Constitution, Article 21(3) of the Law and Article 6(2) of the ECHR, is the starting point for the Panel's assessment of the continued detention on remand. Accordingly, continued detention cannot be maintained lightly and the Accused should be released once his continued detention ceases to be reasonable.¹²

GROUNDED SUSPICION A.

12. As regards the threshold for continued detention, Article 41(6)(a) of the Law requires, as a pre-condition, ¹³ a grounded suspicion that a crime within the jurisdiction of the SC has been committed.14

In this regard, the Panel recalls its previous finding that, by virtue of the decision taken by the Pre-Trial Judge on the confirmation of the indictment against the Accused,15 the requirement of Article 41(6)(a) of the Law has been met and confirmed by an independent judicial authority after analysis of the evidence

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¹² Eighth Review, para. 12; KSC-BC-2020-06, IA004/F00005/RED, Public Redacted Version of Decision on Hashim Thaçi's Appeal Against Decision on Interim Release (Thaçi Interim Release Appeal Decision), 30 April 2021, public, para. 17; European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Buzadji v. The Republic of Moldavia, no. 23755/07, Judgment [GC] (Buzadji v. The Republic of Moldavia [GC]), 5 July 2016, para. 89.

¹³ ECtHR, <u>Buzadji v. The Republic of Moldavia</u> [GC], para. 87.

¹⁴ Ninth Review, para. 11.

¹⁵ KSC-BC-2020-05, F00008/RED, Pre-Trial Judge, Public Redacted Version of the Decision on the Confirmation of the Indictment Against Salih Mustafa, 5 October 2020, public, para. 163(a). The Pre-Trial Judge's findings were made on the basis of a well-grounded suspicion, a standard which exceeds the grounded suspicion threshold required for the purposes of Article 41(6)(a) of the Law; see also F00215/RED, Trial Panel I, Public redacted version of Sixth decision on review of detention, 23 September 2021, public, para. 15.

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presented by the SPO. 16 Further, the Panel has more recently found, in its Rule 130

Decision, that the evidence presented during the SPO case, if accepted, is capable of

supporting a conviction under Counts 1-4 of the Indictment, under one or more of the

modes of individual criminal responsibility with which the Accused is charged.¹⁷

Accordingly, the Panel finds that the requirement under Article 41(6)(a) of the Law

continues to be met.

В. **NECESSITY OF DETENTION**

14. The Panel recalls the standard to be applied to its assessment as to whether the

continued detention of the Accused is necessary, as well as the importance of (case)

specific reasoning and concrete grounds which shall be relied upon by the Panel, as

underlined by the Court of Appeals Panel. 18 Specifically, as regards all risks under

Article 41(6)(b) of the Law, the exercise that the Panel has to conduct is a risk

assessment.19

1. Risk of Flight

Regarding the risk of flight under Article 41(6)(b)(i) of the Law, beside the

arguments reiterated by the SPO from previous submissions, 20 the Panel does not

find the additional factor of the approaching verdict under Article 43 of the Law

strong enough to persuade the Panel to change its previous finding regarding this

risk.²¹ Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Accused is not at flight risk and that

¹⁶ Ninth Review, para. 12.

¹⁷ Rule 130 Decision, paras 33, 39.

¹⁸ Thaçi Interim Release Appeal Decision, para. 22; KSC BC 2020 05, F00127, Trial Panel I, Fourth

decision on review of detention (Fourth Review), 25 May 2021, public, paras 15-17.

¹⁹ Fourth Review, para. 17.

²⁰ SPO Submissions, para. 4; Ninth Review, para. 16.

²¹ Ninth Review, paras 15-17 with reference to KSC-BC-2020-05, F00295/RED, Trial Panel I, Public redacted version of Eighth decision on review of detention (Eighth Review), 21 January 2022, public, paras

7 and 18.

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such a risk, even if it existed, could be adequately mitigated by conditions to be imposed upon him pursuant to Article 41(12) of the Law and Rule 56(5) of the Rules.

2. Risk of Obstructing the Progress of SC Proceedings

16. As previously found by the Panel, there is a risk under Article 41(6)(b)(ii) of the Law that the Accused will obstruct the progress of SC proceedings by interfering with victims and witnesses, and/or their families.²² To this effect, the Panel has relied on a multiplicity of factors, considered altogether: (i) the Accused's knowledge of the charges and potential lengthy sentence, if convicted, may serve as incentives for him, if released, to interfere with victims and witnesses, and/or their families; (ii) the Accused's knowledge of the identity of all SPO witnesses, his ties to the Kosovo intelligence apparatus, his experience as an intelligence officer, his relationship to some of the witnesses and the limited scope of the case make it easier for him to potentially interfere with victims and witnesses, and/or their families, and more generally, to obstruct the progress of the proceedings; (iii) several protected witnesses have testified about instances in which they or their families have been subject to threats and intimidation, and expressed fear to testify in the present proceedings; (iv) witnesses have referred to a general climate of interference and intimidation prevailing in Kosovo against persons who criticise former Kosovo Liberation Army members, including the Accused; and (v) there is a serious risk that – even whilst detained – the Accused will reveal the identities of protected SPO witnesses to other accused persons currently in the SC's custody.23

²² Eighth Review, paras 20-23; Ninth Review, para. 25.

²³ Ninth Review, para. 18.

The Panel does not see any reason to abandon the factors above and to depart from the conclusion that they underpin, in the absence of any compelling factors indicating the opposite. In particular, the Panel recalls that the assessment as to whether there is a risk of obstruction in the future does not require proof that obstruction has occurred in the past.²⁴ In this vein, the Panel reiterates that the Accused's intelligence background has a solid basis, considering that prior to his arrest he was a senior officer with the Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defence of Kosovo.²⁵ Thus, the contacts and ties previously established remain relevant to date. This, coupled with the evidence given by SPO witnesses in relation to incidents of intimidation and interference,26 within the context of a general climate of witness intimidation, constitute strong factors militating in favour of a risk of obstruction, within the meaning of Article 41(6)(b)(ii) of the Law. The Panel further observes that some of the witnesses who provided evidence to this effect are neighbours of the Accused or distant relatives, which makes it even easier for him to reach them and directly interfere with them.²⁷

[REDACTED].²⁸ [REDACTED].²⁹ 18.

In light of the above, the Panel finds that the risk that the Accused will obstruct the progress of SC proceedings by interfering with victims and witnesses, and/or their families continues to exist.

²⁴ Ninth Review, para. 14. Similarly, KSC-BC-2020-06, IA001/F00005, Court of Appeals Panel, Decision on Kadri Veseli's Appeal Against Decision on Interim Release, 30 April 2021, public, para. 38.

²⁵ 069404-TR-ET, Part 1, p. 5; KSC-BC-2020-05, F00009/CONF/RED, Pre-Trial Judge, Confidential Redacted Version of Decision on Request for Arrest Warrant and Transfer Order, 26 January 2021, para. 20.

²⁶ Eighth Review, paras 20-22.

²⁷ Ninth Review, para. 22.

²⁸ [REDACTED].

²⁹ [REDACTED].

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3. Risk of Committing Further Crimes

20. The Panel recalls that, as the conditions set out in Article 41(6)(b) of the Law

are alternative to one another, if one of those conditions is fulfilled, the other

conditions do not have to be addressed in order for detention to be maintained.³⁰

21. Having found that there is a sufficiently real possibility that the Accused will

obstruct the progress of SC proceedings, including by interfering with victims and

witnesses, and/or their families,31 the Panel finds that it need not address the risk

under Article 41(6)(b)(iii) of the Law.32

4. Conclusion

22. In light of the foregoing, the Panel finds that there are articulable grounds to

believe that a risk of obstructing the progress of SC proceedings, as envisaged in

Article 41(6)(b)(ii) of the Law, continues to exist.

C. CONDITIONAL RELEASE

23. The Panel recalls that detention on remand should only be continued if there are

no more lenient measures that could sufficiently mitigate the risks set out in

Article 41(6)(b)(i)-(iii) of the Law.³³ In this regard, the Panel has the obligation to

inquire and evaluate, *proprio motu*, all reasonable conditions that could be imposed on

an accused.34

³⁰ Ninth Review, para. 26.

³¹ See supra para. 19.

³² Ninth Review, para. 27.

³³ Ninth Review, para. 29; KSC-CC-PR-2020-09, F00006, Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court, *Judgement on the Referral of Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Adopted by the Plenary on*

29 and 30 April 2020, 22 May 2020, public, para. 70.

³⁴ Ninth Review, para. 29. See also KSC-BC-2020-06, IA003/F00005/RED, Court of Appeals Panel, Public Redacted Version of Decision on Rexhep Selimi's Appeal Against Decision on Interim Release, 30 April 2021,

public, para. 86.

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The Panel incorporates by reference its findings from the Ninth Review with

regard to conditional release which remain equally valid today.³⁵ The Panel also recalls

the risk factors identified above with regard to the risk of obstructing the progress

of SC proceedings.³⁶ [REDACTED].³⁷

25. With the above in mind, the Panel considers that, should the Accused be

released, no conditions could adequately restrict or monitor his contacts and

communications in order to sufficiently mitigate the risk of obstruction of SC

proceedings.³⁸ No circumstance has occurred since the Ninth Review capable of

changing this finding.

The Panel accordingly finds that no conditions, including those previously

proposed by the Defence³⁹ or any additional limitations to be imposed by the Panel,

would sufficiently mitigate the risk of obstructing the progress of SC proceedings.

Therefore, the Accused must remain in detention.

D. REASONABLENESS OF DURATION OF DETENTION

The Panel notes, first, that the Accused is entitled to trial within a reasonable 27.

time or to release pending trial and, relatedly, recalls its continued obligation to

assess the reasonableness of the Accused's detention after the opening of the case

until a decision on the charges against him is taken, or until proceedings are

otherwise terminated.40

In the circumstances of the present case, the Accused has been in detention

for almost 20 months since he was arrested and transferred to the SC Detention

³⁵ Ninth Review, paras 30-34.

³⁶ See supra paras 16-19.

³⁷ See supra para. 18.

³⁸ See Ninth Review, para. 31.

³⁹ See Ninth Review, para. 34.

⁴⁰ Ninth Review, para. 35.

Facilities, on 24 September 2020. The Panel further notes that the Accused is charged with serious war crimes under Article 14 of the Law, including murder and torture, allegedly committed under multiple modes of criminal responsibility under Article 16 of the Law. The Panel does not identify any period of inactivity in the proceedings against the Accused before the SC, such that could lead to a finding that the duration of the detention has become unreasonable. The Panel particular, that: (i) the trial commenced, as scheduled, 15 September 2021 and the SPO closed its case on 4 February 2022;41 (ii) on 23 February 2022, the Panel issued its Rule 130 Decision; (iii) on 8 and 9 March 2022, the Panel held the Defence Preparation Conference and Victims' Status Conference and issued several orders (including in March, April and May 2022) aimed at ensuring the efficiency and expeditiousness of the proceedings; 42 (iv) on 22 March 2022 the Defence made its opening statement, 43 and (v) at the time of the present decision all Defence witnesses have completed their testimony.

Accordingly, the Panel does not find that the Accused has been detained for an unreasonable period.

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⁴¹ KSC-BC-2020-05, F00308, Specialist Prosecutor, Prosecution Notice of the Closing of its Case pursuant to Rule 129, 4 February 2022, public.

⁴² KSC-BC-2020-05, Transcript of Hearing, 8 March 2022, public; Transcript of Hearing, 9 March 2022 (on the conduct of proceedings), public; Transcript of Hearing, 4 April 2022 (on the language to be used in the examination of Defence witnesses), public; Transcript of Hearing, 22 April 2022 (planning future trial steps), public; Transcript of Hearing, 12 May 2022 (setting the date for the closing of the Defence case), public; Transcript of Hearing, 19 May 2022 (setting timelines regarding rebuttal and rejoinder). ⁴³ KSC-BC-2020-05, Transcript of Hearing, 9 March 2022, public, p. 2521, line 25 to p. 2522, line 5, and p. 2524, line 23 to p. 2525, line 1.

V. DISPOSITION

- 30. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Panel hereby:
 - a. ORDERS the Accused's continued detention;
 - b. **ORDERS** the SPO and Victims' Counsel, if she so wishes, to file submissions on the next review of detention by **Tuesday**, **5 July 2022**; and
 - c. ORDERS the Defence to file submissions on the next review of detention, if it so wishes, by Tuesday, 12 July 2022.

Judge Mappie Veldt-Foglia Presiding Judge

Judge Gilbert Bitti

Judge Roland Dekkers

Dated this Friday, 20 May 2022

At The Hague, the Netherlands.